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SAFEGUARDING INVESTMENT GRADE BONDS IN THE
EVENT OF A LEVERAGED BUYOUT: LEGISLATION OR
CONTRACT?
Prior to the takeover frenzy of the 1980s,' holders of investment grade
bonds2 held relatively safe investments.' The phenomenon of leveraged
buyouts (LBOs), however, has undermined the security of investment grade
bonds. 4 Because a post-LBO company (surviving company) assumes a mas-
sive amount of debt in addition to its pre-LBO (pre-existing) debt, the
surviving company's ability to pay off all its pre-existing debt becomes more
uncertain. 5 Despite this increased uncertainty, the pre-existing bondholders
do not receive any additional return on their investment.6 The bonds of the
pre-existing bondholders, thus, lose value by becoming riskier investments
that still produce the same returns as before the LBO.7 Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." illustrates the deleterious effects of an
LBO on pre-existing, investment grade bondholders and mentions how such
bondholders might protect themselves from LBOs. 9 Investors have two
possible methods of safeguarding their investment grade bonds against the
damaging consequences of an LBO: (1) legislative or regulatory intervention
into the investment market,10 or (2) explicit provisions in the bond contract
that protect the investor in the event of an LBO."
1. See Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stocks and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986,
at Al, col. 1 (describing abundance of corporate takeovers in 1980s).
2. See American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Indentures, at 7 n.3 (1971) [here-
inafter Commentaries] (stating that technical definition of bond is long-term debt security that
is secured by lien on some or all assets of borrower). A debenture is a long term debt security
that is not secured. Id. No formal legal distinction exists between the terms "bond" and
"debenture." Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial
Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 463, 463 n.2 (1989). This
Note uses "bond" in accord with its broader usage as a term for all long-term debt securities.
3. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing conservative characteristics
of investment grade bonds).
4. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (contending that LBOs make investment
grade bonds risky).
5. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (indicating that surviving company may not
be able to pay all its debt).
6. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (asserting that bondholders do not receive
additional compensation for increased risk of bonds).
7. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing loss of value on bonds because
of increased risk and low yield).
8. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
9. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1514-25 (1989).
10. See infra notes 70-132 and accompanying text (describing possible legislative and
regulatory solutions to bondholder losses caused by LBOs).
11. See infra notes 133-75 and accompanying text (illustrating possible contract solutions
to bondholder losses caused by LBOs).
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In an LBO a group of investors use the assets of the target company
to help finance the acquisition of that company.' 2 The investors often obtain
financing from banks and junk bond investors. 3 The investors use this
financing to purchase the target company's outstanding stock at a premium
over the current market value of the stock.14 Following the investors' buyout
of the outstanding shares of the target company, the investors frequently
sell off some of the target company's assets to pay the debt that the
investors owe the banks and the junk bondholders." The surviving company
usually will have little equity compared to a large amount of debt, which
consists of the company's pre-existing debt and its LBO-generated debt.'
6
Bond rating agencies grade bonds according to the issuer's ability to
pay the interest and principal due on the bonds.' 7 Bonds with investment
grade ratings have fairly low interest rates because the bonds are relatively
secure.' 8 Investors who hold investment grade bonds forgo the possibility
of substantial returns and instead opt for modest and safe fixed returns. 9
A highly leveraged buyout, however, changes the character of investment
grade bonds.20 An acquiror in an LBO assumes a vast amount of debt that
12. See Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUm. L. Ray.
1491, 1493 (1987) (stating that target company's assets serve as security for acquiror's loans).
13. See Sherwin, Creditors Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 Mun.
L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1988) (identifying usual lenders in LBO); Comment, Junk Bonds: Do
They Have Value?, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 931-32 (1986) (explaining concept of junk bonds). A
junk bondholder receives a high yield from the issuer because of the high risk of the bond. Id.
14. See Prokesch, supra note 1, at 1 (describing windfall that target company's shareholders
receive as result of LBO),
15. See Sherwin, supra note 13, at 499 (asserting that corporate assets and earnings are
primary sources that investors use to repay acquisition debt).
16. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. Coiu. L. 205, 207 (1988) (stating
that surviving company of LBO usually has little equity relative to debt).
17. See O'Neill & Weinberger, Corporate Restructurings and Bond Ratings, 17 MERGERS
& AcQuismoNs 36, 36 (1982) (stating that bond rating indicates likelihood that company will
pay bond's principal and interest on time); Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics of Leveraged
Takeovers, 65 WAsH. U.L.Q. 163, 163 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter Lehn, Blackwell] (describing how
rating agencies rate bonds). Rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, grade
securities to indicate to investors the quality of the securities. Id. These ratings reflect each
agency's opinion of the company's ability to repay its debt. Id. An investment grade rating,
the highest rating, indicates that the company appears to be capable of making interest and
principal payments when such payments are due. Id. Investment grade ratings are AAA, AA,
A, BBB for Standard & Poor's and Aaa, Aa, A, Baa for Moody's. Id. A speculative grade
rating indicates that the issuer has risky characteristics or questionable credit strength and may
not be able to keep current on interest or principal payments. Id. While Standard & Poor's
rates speculative grade bonds as BB, B, CCC, CC, C, Moody's rates such bonds as Ba, B,
Caa, Ca, C, Id. Because these bonds are more risky than investment grade bonds, speculative,
or "junk," bonds pay higher yields than the investment grade bonds. Id.
18. See Commentaries, supra note 2, at I (stating that typical goal of investment grade
bondholder is not substantial gain, but rather reasonable assurance that company will make
principal and interest payments).
.19. See id. at 1-2 (asserting that bondholders forego share in profits in return for periodic
payments and for repayment of principal at fixed date).
20. See Knight, Raids Put New Risk into Bonds, Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1988, at D9,
col. 3 (stating that LBOs make investment grade bonds less secure).
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becomes the responsibility of the surviving company. 2' Because the com-
pany's risk of defaulting on its pre-existing debt increases as a result of the
additional LBO debt,22 rating agencies downgrade the rating of the pre-
existing investment grade bonds to reflect the increased risk.? The surviving
company, however, does not pay more interest on the pre-existing bonds
to compensate bondholders for the additional risk created by the LBO.Y
The market value of the pre-existing bonds declines,2 and the holders of
the pre-existing bonds incur capital losses if the bondholders sell the bonds.
26
In addition to the decreased value of the bonds, bondholders contend
that LBOs damage the liquidity of their investment grade bonds. 27 Liquidity,
which is an inherent characteristic of investment grade bonds, has two
dimensions: (1) the ability of an investor to sell the bonds quickly, and (2)
the ability of an investor to attain a reasonable price for the bonds. 2 An
LBO usually does not affect the first aspect of liquidity because, after an
LBO, an investor still may dispose of bonds easily in secondary markets. 29
21. See Prokesch, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that surviving company in LBO assumes
substantial amount of debt to finance LBO).
22. See Barkley, Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders, 20 CRMoHTON L. Ray. 47, 49 (1986)
(stating that corporate debt is risky when possibility exists that corporation may not be able to
pay all its debts). If a surviving company exchanges a substantial amount of equity for a
significant amount of debt, the company's ability to repay its debt becomes more uncertain.
See Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667,
668 (explaining that decrease in amount of issuer's assets increases likelihood of default on
bonds).
23. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 471 (asserting that downgrading of bond ratings is
familiar consequence of LBOs).
24. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 286 (describing how companies inadequately com-
pensate pre-existing bondholders because interest rate on bonds does not rise with companies'
incurrence of additional LBO-debt).
25. See R. Pos~NR & K. SCOTT, ECONOWCS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 236 (1980) (asserting that, as debt of company rises and yield on bonds remains
constant, market value of bond declines). Posner and Scott note that, if a company issues debt
at a price that reflects one degree of business risk and leverage, and then increases that risk
and leverage, the value of the debt will fall. Id. The term "leverage" refers to the amount of
debt in relation to equity in the company's capital structure. Id.
26. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 207 (explaining that bondholders will incur losses by
selling bonds after LBO).
27. See Answering Brief of MetLife and Jefferson-Pilot at 10, Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (No. 88-8266) [hereinafter
MetLife's Answering Brief] (contending that LBO fundamentally alters character of investment
grade bonds by impairing liquidity of bonds).
28. See Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 COLtrM. L. REv. 260, 263 (1968) (defining liquid market as one that enables investors to
dispose of shares without undue delay and without incurring unreasonable loss); Schreiber and
Schwartz, Efficient Price Discovery in a Securities Market: The Objective of a Trading System
in Mgm-T MAKING AND TfE CHANGiNO STRucnr OF THE SECURTmS INDusmy 19, 25 (1985)
[hereinafter MAxET MAKmNG] (defining two dimensions of liquid market: ease in finding buyer
and reasonableness of price at which investor can dispose of shares).
29. See Wu, supra note 28, at 263 (contending that investors can sell shares readily in
secondhand market after LBO). A market is primary if the company that issued the securities
1990]
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An LBO, however, adversely affects the second dimension of liquidity, an
investor's ability to sell the bonds at a reasonable price in the secondary
market.3 0 Bonds become less liquid because the bondholders cannot quickly
convert their investment grade bonds into cash without suffering a price
reduction.3 A liquid market assumes that the public has confidence in the
market and will invest in the market.12 In the primary market a company
will have difficulty selling bonds unless creditors believe that the company
has sufficient equity with which to repay its debt. 3 The relationship of the
receives the proceeds from the sale of the securities. BARRoN's DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INvEsTMENT TERMs 306 (2d ed. 1987). A secondary market involves the buying and selling of
previously issued securities. Id.
30. See generally MARKET MAKING, supra note 28, at 25 (asserting that investment may
be illiquid if investor, because of price volatility, is uncertain about ability to convert investment
into cash).
31. See Prokesch, supra note 1, at D4, col. 1 (discussing non-liquid market for bonds
after takeovers). Prokesch notes that Pantry Pride's leveraged buyout of Revlon, Inc. illustrates
an LBO's effect on the marketability of pre-existing investment grade bonds. Id. Prior to the
announcement of the LBO, Revlon bonds traded at par. Id. When Pantry Pride launched a
$1.5 billion LBO of Revlon, the Revlon bonds subsequently fell from a rating of investment
grade A to a rating of speculative grade B. Id. Investors became wary of Revlon bonds because
Revlon appeared to be a debt-laden company. Id. Revlon bonds, consequently, dropped to a
trading price of $87. 875. Id.; see also Wallace, Buyouts Devastating Bondholders, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1988 at DI, col. 3 (stating effect of proposed LBO on Kraft, Inc. bonds). Wallace
asserts that Phillip Morris's proposed LBO of Kraft, Inc. adversely affected the liquidity of
Kraft's bonds. Id. Kraft's bonds were selling at prices twenty points lower after Phillip Morris
proposed an LBO of Kraft. Id. But see Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments
and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duica L.J. 173, 182
(discussing bondholders' pricing of bonds). Macey contends that investors who buy bonds
consider how equityholders in the company will act in the future. Id. Bondholders, consequently,
buy bonds only after realizing that the equity of the firm may later dissipate. Id.; see Lehn,
Blackwell, supra note 17, at 185 (asserting that, when buying bonds, bondholders account for
potential adverse actions of equityholders). Bondholders who forego protective covenants in
bond contracts presumably receive higher interest rates and bear the increased risk of a company's
later distribution of equity to its shareholders. Id.; see also Smith & Warner, On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, in EcoNoMIcs oF CORuoRATIoN LAW AND
SEcuitrrms REGULATION 258, 260 (1980) (contending that bondholders price bonds in accordance
with potential risk of issuing company). Smith and Warner argue that bondholders understand
that, after a company issues bonds, the management of the company might try to maximize
the return to the shareholders by distributing the company's equity to the shareholders. Id. In
pricing bonds, therefore, investors estimate how management will treat shareholders and pay a
price that reflects the possibility that management subsequently may transfer wealth to the
shareholders. Id.; see also Bratton, supra note 22, at 733 (stating that, as long as company can
repay its'debts, company has not legally harmed bondholders). Although the market value of
investment grade bonds may decline due to an LBO, pre-existing bondholders may be able to
avoid actual monetary loss. Id. If bondholders retain their less valuable pre-existing bonds and
the surviving company avoids bankruptcy, the bondholders would not incur loss. Commentaries,
supra note 2, at 2.
32. See generally Wu, supra note 28, at 263 (contending that investor confidence in
security is vital for security to be liquid).
33. See Baxter, Leverage Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital, 22 J. FIN. 395, 395 (1967)
(positing that it is difficult for company to sell bonds unless creditor believes that debtor has
sufficient equity cushion).
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company's debt to equity also applies when pre-existing bondholders seek
to sell bonds in the secondary market after an LBO. 34 The value of bonds,
therefore, drops when potential buyers believe that the bonds have become
more risky after an LBO.
3 5
The multibillion dollar buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc. (RJR) by the
investment firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR) is an example
of an LBO's devastating impact on the value of pre-existing investment
grade bonds. 6 During the 1980s RJR issued investment grade bonds on the
basis of RJR's financial strength and RJR's pledge of future profitability.
37
RJR's investment grade bonds with a solid credit rating and stable price
were popular investments. 3 1 Many bond investors, consequently, accepted
indentures from RJR that lacked protective covenants. 39 The few RJR bond




On October 20, 1988, RJR management announced its plan to acquire
the outstanding stock of RJR by means of an LBO. 4' After an extensive
bidding war between KKR and an investment group led by RJR manage-
ment, RJR's board eventually accepted KKR's bid of $24.9 billion for the
purchase of RJR's common stock at $109 per share.4 2 Because RJR was to
assume billions of dollars of debt to finance the LBO, market prices of
RJR's pre-existing investment grade bonds plunged.43 Rating agencies sub-
34. See Wallace, A Bruising Battle Over Bonds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at DI, col.
2 (stating that trading of bonds on secondary market will drop if companies are debt-laden
after LBO).
35. See generally MAP= MAKiNG, supra note 28, at 55 (illustrating that market value
of security changes because of market participants' evaluation of security changes).
36. See Wallace, supra note 31, at D1, col. 1 (describing damage inflicted on RJR
bondholders by KKR's leverage buyout of RJR).
37. See Vlahakis and Nussbaum, Old Indentures-New Transactions: Issuers and Debt-
holders Beware, MERGERS AND AcQuisrToNs: TODAY'S STRATEGIES AND TEcHNIQUES 28, 54
(1989) (relying on its financial strength, RJR issued relatively covenant-free, low interest debt
in 1980s).
38. See Knight, supra note 20, at D9 (stating that RJR investment grade bonds once were
popular investments).
39. See generally Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 117 (asserting that, with largest, most stable corporate
borrowers, bond contract protection appeared superfluous given these institutions' strength and
clear interest of management in maintaining stability).
40. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (describing original MetLife-RJR indentures
that contained contractual protection and paid lower yields than covenant-free bonds).
41. See Gilpin, Bid for RJR Jolts Bonds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at DI1, col. 1
(reporting RJR management's proposed buyout of RJR stock for $17 billion); Caprino, Nabisco
Breaks Off KKR Negotiations, Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1988 at D9 (describing bidding war
between RJR management and KKR for RJR's outstanding stock).
42. See Courts Find No Implied Covenant To RJR Bondholders Not to Undertake LBO,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 844 (June 9, 1989) (describing RJR shareholders acceptance of
KKR's LBO bid). The pre-LBO price of RJR stock was $55 per share. Wallace, slipra note 34,
at cl.
43. See Wallace, supra note 31, at DI, col. I (stating that some RJR bonds fell as much
1990]
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sequently lowered RJR bonds from an investment grade rating to a specu-
lative grade rating-44 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (MetLife), an
institutional investor holding $340 million in RJR unsecured, investment
grade bonds, suffered a $40 million paper loss as a result of the downgraded
investment grade bonds.
45
As a result of the drop in the market value of the RJR bonds, two
institutional bondholders, MetLife and Jefferson Pilot Insurance Co. (Jef-
ferson Pilot) jointly sued RJR and RJR's former Chief Executive Officer,
F. Ross Johnson, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc."4 The plaintiffs brought nine causes of action.47 To date, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying New
York law, has ruled on five of the claims.4 The court in Metropolitan Life
addressed in detail the plaintiffs' claim of breach of implied covenant of
as $160 per $1000 of face amount). Because of the LBO, RJR's debt payments rose from $549
million in 1988 to $3.38 billion in 1989. See Baker, RJR Reports Losses, Strong Cash Flow,
Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1990, at D10 (describing RJR's increased debt payments due to
LBO).
44. See Light, Investors Are Developing a Taste for This Poison, Bus. WK., July 10,
1989, at 78 (stating that rating agencies downgraded RJR bonds from investment grade A to
speculative grade BB after LBO announcement); supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing
how rating agencies rate bonds).
45. See Wallace, Nabisco Sued Over Bond Drop, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1988, at D3, col.
4 (stating loss to MetLife if KKR's proposed buyout of RJR occurred). A paper loss is an
unrealized capital loss. BARRoN's DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 282 (2d ed.
1987). Investors calculate a paper loss by comparing the current market price of the bond to
the price at which the investor originally bought the bond. Id. The investor realizes paper losses
upon selling the securities. Id.
46. 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
47. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). Count I of the Metropolitan Life complaint alleged a breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (against both defendants); Count II alleged fraud
(against both defendants); Count III alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (against both defendants); Count IV alleged violations of Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (only on behalf of plaintiff Jefferson Pilot against both defendants); Count V was
labeled "In Equity" (against both defendants); Count VI alleged breach of duties (against
defendant Johnson); Count VII alleged tortious interference with property (against defendant
Johnson); Count VIII alleged tortious interference with contract (against defendant Johnson);
and Count IX alleged violation of fraudulent conveyance laws (against defendant RJR). Id.
48. See id at 1526 (stating plaintiffs' claims which Metropolitan Life court dismissed). In
Metropolitan Life Judge Walker of the United States District Court for the Southern District
New York dismissed Count II (alleging fraud against both defendants), Count III (alleging
violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 against both defendants),
and Count IX (alleging violation of fraudulent conveyance laws against RJR) for want of
requisite particularity. Id. Judge Walker also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on Count I (alleging breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against RJR)
and Count V ("In Equity" claim against both defendants). Id. The claims, therefore, that
remain are Count IV (only on behalf of plaintiff Jefferson Pilot alleging violation of section
11 of Securities Act of 1933 against both defendants), Count VI (alleging breach of duties
against Johnson), Count VII (alleging tortious interference with property against Johnson), and
Count VIII (alleging tortious interference with contract against Johnson). Id.
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good faith and fair dealing and the plaintiffs' "In Equity" claim. 49
In the plaintiffs' claim of breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, MetLife and Jefferson Pilot contended that KKR's buyout
of RJR deprived the plaintiffs of the "fruits" of their bond agreements
with RJR and destroyed the value of the plaintiffs' investment grade bonds.50
Once the holders of low risk, low yield securities, the plaintiffs involuntarily
became holders of speculative junk bonds after KKR's buyout of RJR.5'
The plaintiffs further argued that, by engaging in the LBO, RJR drastically
impaired the value of the plaintiffs' bonds by misappropriating the market
value of the bonds to help finance the LBO.12 Although conceding that the
management of RJR had a great deal of discretion in operating RJR, the
plaintiffs asserted that RJR's participation in an LBO was not within the
management's discretion. 3 The plaintiffs claimed that RJR's management,
by abusing its discretion, breached an implied basis of the parties' bargain,
which was to maintain the high ratings of the investment grade bonds.54
The Metropolitan Life court granted RJR's motion of summary judg-
ment against plaintiffs' claim of breach of an implied duty to maintain the
ratings of the investment grade bonds.55 In Metropolitan Life Judge Walker
noted that courts will read an implied covenant into an indenture only if
the explicit language of the indenture infers such a covenant5 6 Judge Walker
49. See id. at 1514-24 (ruling on plaintiffs' claim of breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and "In Equity" claim).
50. See MetLife's Answering Brief, supra note 27, at 2-3 (contending that basis of
plaintiffs' bargain with RJR was investment grade rating of bonds). By assuming a substantial
amount of debt, the plaintiffs asserted that RJR intentionally destroyed the blue chip strength
of the bonds. Id.
51. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (describing impact of LBO on RJR
bondholders).
52. MetLife's and Jefferson Pilot's Memorandum In Support of Summary Judgment at
26-32, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (No. 88-8266) [hereinafter MetLife's Brief]. The plaintiffs in Metropolitan Life claimed
that RJR advertised RJR investment grade bonds as historically secure investments. Id. Once
RJR sold its bonds, however, the plaintiffs asserted that RJR subsequently sought to pay out
a substantial portion of its equity, which was part of RJR's financial stability, to shareholders
as part of the LBO. Id. The plaintiffs thus argued that RJR management misappropriated the
value of plaintiffs' investment grade bonds by allowing KKR to buy RJR's outstanding stock
at a premium and thereafter deplete the assets and earnings of RJR. Id.
53. See id. at 3 (explaining plaintiffs' claim). The plaintiffs in Metropolitan Life asserted
that the RJR management did not have the discretion to engage voluntarily in a buyout that
would destroy the investment grade ratings of RJR bonds. Id.
54. See MetLife's Brief, supra note 52, at 3 (contending that RJR bonds were attractive
because of security). The plaintiffs in Metropolitan Life asserted that they bought RJR bonds
because of the bonds' inherent security. Id. The plaintiffs argued that, by engaging in the LBO,
RJR management destroyed that inherent security, the basis of the bargain between the plaintiffs
and RJR. Id.
55. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1521-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
56. Id. at 1517; see also Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F.
Supp. 669, 673 (S.D.N.Y.) (refusing to grant relief to bondholder who claimed breach of
implied covenant unless implied covenant derived its substance directly from language of
indenture), vacated on procedural grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985).
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stated that the indentures did not contain any RJR guarantee to maintain
the credit rating of the bonds held by the plaintiffs.17 Because the indentures
lacked any express covenants that referred to the downgrading of investment
grade bonds, the court refused to imply a covenant and thereby create an
indenture term for which the parties had not bargained."
The plaintiffs "In Equity" claim stated that RJR's intentional distri-
bution of equity to buy out the shareholders' outstanding stock was 4
"compelling example" of unjust enrichment and frustration of purpose. 9
The plaintiffs contended that RJR issued investment grade bonds to the
plaintiffs with assurances that RJR would continue to be an economically
strong company with a secure equity base. 60 By engaging in the LBO,
however, RJR distributed a substantial amount of its equity to RJR stock-
holders to maximize the buyout price of the shareholders' stock. 6' The
plaintiffs claimed that RJR's distribution of equity unjustly benefitted the
RJR stockholders at the expense of the holders of RJR bonds and that the
distribution of equity impeded RJR's ability to maintain an investment
grade rating on its bonds.
62
In addition to dismissing the claim of breach of implied covenant, the
Metropolitan Life court granted RJR's motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' "In Equity" claim.63 Judge Walker initially noted that the
"In Equity" claim was similar to the plaintiffs' implied contract claim. 4
The Metropolitan Life court, consequently, rejected the plaintiffs' three
general equitable claims of unjust enrichment, frustration of purpose, and
breach of fiduciary duty.
65
57. Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1519. Judge Walker did state in Metropolitan Life
that, while courts will use an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to ensure that
the parties perform any bargained for rights, courts will not permit an implied covenant to
shoehorn into an indenture any terms for which the parties did not bargain. Id.
58. Id. at 1522.
59. See MetLife's Brief, supra note 52, at 55 (explaining allegations of unjust enrichment
and frustration of purpose in MetLife's "In Equity" claim). The plaintiffs in Metropolitan Life
asserted that RJR's scheme to sell low risk, low yield bonds to help finance a subsequent
takeover unjustly enriched both the defendants and RJR stockholders at the expense of holders
of RJR investment grade bonds. Id. The plaintiffs argued that RJR, who sold investment grade
bonds on the basis of a strong balance sheet, frustrated the plaintiffs' investment purpose by




63. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
64. Id. at 1522.
65. See id. at 1523-24 (rejecting plaintiffs' "In Equity" claim). The Metropolitan Life
court found that the plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment failed because the defendants did
not violate any indenture term and, consequently, need not make restitution to the plaintiffs.
Id. The Metropolitan Life court rejected plaintiffs' claim of frustration of purpose because the
plaintiffs did not establish any of the three elements of such a claim. Id. Although the plaintiffs
did not refer explicitly to a fiduciary duty owed by the management of RJR to RJR bondholders,
the plaintiffs implicitly asserted that RJR management breached its fiduciary duty to the
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Metropolitan Life admonishes investors that courts will not protect
bondholders' interests by implying covenants into a bond indenture.6 The
Metropolitan Life court, however, did suggest ways in which future bond-
holders might protect their interests. Judge Walker repeatedly stated that
some of the RJR indentures which MetLife originally accepted contained
covenants that would have protected MetLife against their loss resulting
from the buyout of RJR.67 MetLife, however, agreed to exchange these
specific protective covenants for alternative benefits. 6
Knowing that courts are reluctant to imply protective covenants into
indentures, many holders of investment grade bonds look to the government
to protect investment grade bonds. These bondholders advocate two poten-
tial solutions. First, bondholders urge legislatures to extend the manage-
ment's fiduciary duty to bondholders. 69 Second, bondholders propose that
the Securities and Exchange Commission expand rule 13e-3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to require that companies give bondholders public
evaluations of the fairness of an impending LBO.70
The traditional view of corporate law dictates that a corporation owes
a fiduciary duty to its stockholders but not to its bondholders. 71 In the
event of an LBO, therefore, management has a fiduciary duty to maximize
plaintiffs. Id. The Metropolitan Life court relied on'case law to reject summarily the breach of
fiduciary duty claim. Id.; see infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text (describing lack of
fiduciary duty owed by management of company to company's bondholders).
66. See Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1519 (contending that courts will not imply
non-existant covenants into indenture to protect bondholders).
67. See id. at 1510, 1519, 1521 (noting that some original indentures protected RJR
bondholders from LBO results). In its Amended Complaint MetLife listed six debt issues on
which MetLife based its causes of action. Id. at 1510. The indentures for two of the six issues
once contained covenants that expressly restricted RJR's ability to incur precisely the type of
debt that RJR incurred when KKR bought out the RJR stock. Id.
68. Metropolitan Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1519, 1521. In 1985 MetLife voluntarily exchanged
bonds that contained explicit covenants which would have protected the bonds against an LBO
for bonds without such restrictions. Herzel & Shepro, Bondholder Suits in the U.S., Financial
Times, Dec. 21, 1989. The Metropolitan Life court also noted that, because an indenture is a
private contract, courts should not alter an indenture before the company becomes insolvent or
violates a covenant. Id. Such court intervention would inhibit the operation of a free market.
Id. at 1508; see Bratton, supra note 39, at 102 (contending that, in debtor-creditor relationship,
law holds to policy of non-intervention until debtor becomes insolvent).
69. See infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of legislatures
extending management's fiduciary duties to bondholders).
70. See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of SEC expanding
security disclosure laws to apply to bondholder in LBOs).
71. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593 n.5 (Del. 1986) (stating
that relationship between corporation and its directors and bondholders is contractual and not
fiduciary in nature). The traditional and still dominant view of corporate fiduciary duty is that
management represents the shareholders; bondholders, creditors, suppliers, and employees create
and protect their own particular interests through contracts with the corporation. Oesterle, The
Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CoRNEu. L.
Rnv. 117, 138 (1986).
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shareholders' gains but has no similar obligation to bondholders,7 2 Conse-
quently, if bondholders suffer great losses in an LBO while stockholders
profit, management can claim to have satisfied its legal duty by maximizing
shareholder wealth.73 Legislatures could protect bondholders from an LBO's
damaging effects by extending management's fiduciary duty to bondholders
and thereby forcing management to consider bondholders' interests in
addition to shareholders' interests. 74 Management, consequently, would vi-
olate its fiduciary duty to bondholders if management agreed to an LBO
that would weaken the value of bondholders' investment grade bonds.75
Twenty-one states have laws that allow the directors of a company
to consider how management's actions affect the company's employees,
suppliers, 76 and customers.7 7 These laws, however, are purely permis-
72. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that management's concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when
company is target of takeover). No statute or case law protects bondholders, except in extreme
situations, against a debtor's acts. Commentaries, supra note 2, at 2.
73. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (stating that when company is engaged in buyout,
management's objective is to sell stock to highest bidder and thereby maximize shareholder
wealth).
74. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 270 (contending that directors should consider interests
of both bondholders and stockholders); Barkley, supra note 22, at 67 (arguing for extending
management's fiduciary duty to bondholders). But see Dowd, Washington's War Against LBO
Debt, FoaTuNa, Feb. 13, 1989, at 91 (contending that neither SEC nor Congress will act in
near future to protect bondholders by extending management's fiduciary duty to bondholders).
Dowd notes that, although the RJR buyout caused Washington to take notice of bondholder
losses, neither Congress nor the SEC has enacted any measures that directly would deal with
the dilemma of bondholder losses caused by LBOs. Id.; see also Bratton, supra note 22, at 735
(asserting that, if legislatures extend management's fiduciary obligations to bondholders, other
non-stockholder groups will ask legislatures to extend management's fiduciary duties to other
non-stockholder groups as well). Bratton asserts that the possibility of management owing
fiduciary duties to suppliers, customers, and creditors clearly undermines management's primary
duty to maximize returns to common shareholders. Id.; see also Bondholders Ponder Weapons
in Era of Buyouts, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 552 (Apr. 14, 1989) (noting that SEC's
Chief Economist, Kenneth Lehn, is against expanding management's fiduciary duty to non-
stockholders). Lehn states that any expansion of management's fiduciary duty to bondholders
would set "very, very dangerous precedent" because such an expansion would necessitate
extending the duty further to other corporate constituents, such as employees, suppliers, and
creditors. Id.; see also Brady Urges Curbs on LBO Tax Dividends Be Linked to Double Dividend
Tax Relief, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 153 (Jan. 27, 1989) (noting that Secretary of Treasury
Nicholas Brady is against extending management's fiduciary duty to non-stockholders); Hector,
The Bondholders Cold New World, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1989, at 83 (noting that recently retired
SEC chairman David Ruder is against extending management's fiduciary duty to non-stock-
holders); Salwen, SEC Should Get Authority to Monitor Brokers' Debt, Nominee Breeden Says,
Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1989, at 17, coL. 3 (noting that current SEC chairman Richard Breeden is
against extending management's fiduciary duty to non-stockholders).
75. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 247 (stating that, if management owes fiduciary duty
to bondholders, any management decision that causes stock prices to rise and bond prices to
fall would be prima facie evidence of management's breach of fiduciary duty to bondholders).
76. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 462 (explaining that bondholders are "suppliers" of
capital to company).
77. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-313(e) (West 1988) (allowing management to consider
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sive.78 For example, the Indiana statute, which is a typical non-stockholder
constituency statute, provides that the directors of a company may, but are
not required to, consider the interests of non-stockholder corporate constit-
uencies in deciding whether to engage in a takeover.7 9 The permissive nature
of the Indiana statute does not necessarily protect bondholders' interests.8 0
For instance, even if New York law paralleled Indiana law at the time of
KKR's buyout of RJR, RJR management still could have justified its actions
despite the substantial loss to bondholders because RJR management did
not owe a mandatory fiduciary duty to RJR bondholders."'
interests of non-stockholder groups in corporate transactions); FLA. STAT. ANN. §607.111.9
(West 1989) (same); GA. CODE ANN. §14-2-205.5 (Harrison 1989) (same); IDAHO CODE, chap.
16, §30-1602 and chap. 17, §30-1702 (1988) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §23-1-35-1(d) (Burns Supp. 1988) (same); IOWA CODE
§496A.34 (1989) (same);Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §271A.397(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989) (same);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §12:92(G) (West 1988) (same); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §716 (1964
& Supp. 1988) (same); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, §65 (West 1989) (same); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §302A, 251 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.347 (Vernon Supp.
1989) (same); NEB. REv. STAT. §21-2035(i) (1988) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-11-35(d) (Supp.
1988); (same); N.Y. Bus. & CORP. LAW §717(b) (McKinney 1989) (same); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (same); OR. Rnv. STAT. §60.357 (1989) (same); 42
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §1721(c) (Purdon 1989) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-35-204 (1988)
(same); Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.305 (West Supp. 1988) (same).
78. See J. Grnndfest, Remarks at Meeting of American Bar Association on the Impact
of LBO's on Debtholders and Other Corporate Constituencies (1989 Honolulu) (asserting that
statutes that expand management's fiduciary duties to non-stockholders are permissive).
79. See IND. CODE ANN. §23-1-35-1 (Bum Supp. 1989) (providing that directors may
consider non-stockholder interests in change of control transactions). Section 23-1-35-1 provides
that:...
(d)
A director may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider the
effects of any action on shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers of
the corporation....
(0
Directors are not required to consider the effects of a proposed corporate
action on any particular corporate constituent group or interest as a dominant
or controlling factor.... Certain judicial decisions in Delaware and other
jurisdictions, which might otherwise be looked to for guidance in interpreting
Indiana corporate law, including decisions relating to potential change of
control transactions that impose a different or higher degree of scrutiny on
actions taken by directors in response to a proposed acquisition of control of
the corporation are inconsistent with . . . this article.
80. But see McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 442
n.148 (1986) (providing example of effective potential legislation that would protect bondholders'
interest). McDaniel states that, although no current law goes so far, the Articles of Incorporation
for the Control Data Corporation provide adequate protection for bondholders. Id. Article Ten
of Control Data's Articles of Incorporation states that the board of directors, in determining
the best interests of the corporation and shareholders, shall give due consideration to the social
and economic effects on employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and other constit-
uents of the corporation and subsidiaries. Id. If New York had a statute similar to the provision
in Control Data's Articles of Incorporation at the time of the RJR buyout, RJR management
would have had difficulty justifying to the court management's decision to buy out the common
stock in light of the resulting extensive losses to bondholders.
81. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1508
(explaining RJR management's justification of LBO of RJR).
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In addition to the legislative debate whether to expand the fiduciary
duties of management, courts have considered whether to extend manage-
ment's fiduciary obligations to bondholders. In Pepper v. Litton 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted the plaintiff, a
controlling stockholder, a judgment which ensured that the insolvent com-
pany pay the plaintiff at the expense of the company's bondholders. 3 The
United States Supreme Court, in overturning the Fourth Circuit's decision,
held that the standard of fiduciary obligations should protect both stock-
holders' interests and creditors' interests in the company. 4 Although the
language of the Supreme Court's decision in Pepper is broad, the facts of
Pepper limit the imposition of a fiduciary duty on management to creditors
only when a company becomes insolvent.85 Courts after Pepper have ex-
tended the fiduciary duty of management to bondholders, but only in
extreme circumstances such as fraud, insolvency, or a statutory violation. 86
Despite these exceptions, case law stands unequivocally opposed to
extending management's fiduciary duties to bondholders. In Revlon, Inc.
v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.8 7 Revlon management, combatting
a hostile takeover attempt, sought a "friendly" investment firm that would
take over Revlon in a leveraged buyout.88 Revlon management chose the
investment firm of Forstmann Little & Co. because Forstmann Little offered
to protect Revlon bonds if the bonds lost market value because of the
impending buyout. 9 The Delaware Supreme Court enjoined Revlon's choice
of Forstmann Little and held that Revlon's management was not free to
take non-stockholder interests into account when Revlon was the target of
a buyout.90 The Revlon court further found that management's central
concern in a buyout should be to benefit stockholders by obtaining the
highest possible price for the outstanding stock. 9' The Revlon court reasoned
82. 100 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1939).
83. Pepper v. Litton, 100 F.2d 830, 832 (4th Cir. 1939).
84. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
85. See Bratton, supra note 22, at 734 n.247 (noting that Pepper court extended fiduciary
duty to bondholders only after corporation became insolvent).
86. See Harff v. Kerkorian, 347 A.2d 133, 133-34 (Del. 1975) (extending management's
fiduciary duty to bondholders in case alleging management's intentional looting of corporation);
Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore Ohio R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 1982), (extending
management's fiduciary duty to bondholders in case where bondholders proved that management
improperly eliminated bondholders' conversion rights) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). But
see Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. Ch. 1987) (deciding contrary to Pittsburgh
Terminal). The Simons court questioned Judge Gibbons's assertion in Pittsburgh Terminal that
fiduciary obligations run to bondholders. Id. The Simons court noted that Judge Gibbons cited
little authority to support his conclusion in Pittsburgh Terminal. Id.
87. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
88. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175-76 (Del.
1986).
89. Id. at 179. The Revlon court noted that, after the announcement of the LBO of
Revlon, the trading price of Revlon bonds dropped from $100 to $87.50. Id. at 178.
90. Id. at 182.
91. Id. The Revlon court acknowledged that a board of directors may have regard for
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that, because the bond indentures contained all of the bondholders' rights
and management did not violate any provisions of the indentures, the
bondholders did not deserve any further protection from the court. 92
In Simons v. Cogan93 the plaintiff, a holder of convertible bonds,
claimed that the management of the defendant corporation, Knoll Interna-
tional, Inc. (Knoll) violated its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by eliminating
the conversion feature on the bonds that the plaintiff held.9 4 Under the
original indenture the plaintiff could convert each $19.20 of principal
amount of bonds into one share of Class A common stock of Knoll.
95
Subsequent to a merger, Knoll entered into a supplementary indenture to
the indenture pursuant to which plaintiff's bonds were issued which stated
that holders of convertible bonds could convert every $19.20 of principal
amount of bonds into only $12 cash, the price of each share of common
stock in the merger.9 6 The plaintiff claimed that he lost the conversion
feature of the bonds after the merger because no reasonable investor would
convert $19.20 worth of bonds into $12 of cash. 97 After noting that the
traditional approach to corporate law does not extend a fiduciary duty from
management to bondholders, the Simons court refused to extend manage-
ment's fiduciary obligations to bondholders. 98 The Simons court admonished
future bondholders to protect against losses by only accepting indentures
that contain explicit protective covenants. 99
Finally, in Katz v. Oak Industries100 the plaintiff bondholder claimed
a violation of fiduciary duty when the defendant corporation sought to
exchange new securities and cash for a portion of the corporation's out-
standing debt in an amount less than the face value of the debt.' 0' In
holding that the defendant did not breach any fiduciary duty to the plaintiff,
the Delaware Chancery Court noted that management's relationship to
bondholders is contractual, not fiduciary, and that bondholders' rights
appear in the indenture. 0 2 The Katz court further found that directors have
various corporate constituencies in discharging the board's responsibilities. Id. The court,
however, stated that a board's sole concern in a buyout is to benefit the company's shareholders.
Id.
92. Id.
93. 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987).
94. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 787 (Del. Ch. 1987).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 788. The plaintiff in Simons asserted that twelve dollars per share is an unfairly
low price and inadequate consideration for the loss of a right to receive Class A share. Id.
98. Id. at 791. The Simons court did not extend management's fiduciary duty to cover
bondholders for fear of undermining the already established non-fiduciary relationship between
bondholders and solvent corporations. Id.
99. Id. at 786-87.
100. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
101. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 878 (Del. Ch. 1986).
102. Id. at 879. The Katz court asserted that the fights and obligations of the board and
the bondholders appear or should appear in the indenture. Id. The court further noted that the
terms of the agreed upon contract, not broad concepts such as fairness, define the corporation's
obligation to its bondholders. Id.
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a duty to attempt to maximize the interests of shareholders and that, if
management sometimes does so "at the expense of others," management
will not have breached its duty. 103
As an alternative to the legislative or judicial extension of management's
fiduciary obligations to bondholders, bondholders also may seek protection
under rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.04 Rule 13e-3
requires that companies who undertake certain transactions0 provide ma-
terial information' 1° to shareholders to allow the shareholders to evaluate
the particular transaction.' 7 A company must disclose to shareholders a
detailed analysis of the company's belief that a transaction will be fair to
all equity shareholders. 08 If any shareholders conclude that the transaction
is unfair, the company, before undertaking the transaction, must provide
such shareholders with an outline of whatever remedies are available to the
shareholders under applicable law.109 Rule 13e-3, however, only requires
disclosure to holders of equity securities" 0 and, moreover, does not govern
103. Id.
104. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, 100 (1989).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3)(i) (1989) (stating that rule 13e-3 covers such transactions
as stock purchases, tender offers, mergers, consolidations, reclassifications, recapitalizations,
reorganizations, sales of assets by company to affiliates, and reverse stock splits).
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100(1)-(15) (1989) (defining "material information"). Section
240.13e-100 provides that material information includes: (1) the issuer and the class of security
subject to the transaction; (2) the details and background of the transaction participants; (3)
the past contacts, transactions, and negotiations with the party; (4) the terms of the present
transaction; (5) the proposed plans of the issuer; (6) the source and amounts of funds; (7) the
purpose(s), alternatives, reasons and effects of the transaction; (8) the fairness of the transaction;
(9) the reports, opinions, appraisals, and certain negotiations; (10) the interest in securities of
the issuer; (11) the present intention and recommendations of certain persons with regard to
the transaction; (12) the contracts, arrangements, or understandings with respect to the issuer's
securities; (13) other provisions of the transaction; (14) financial information; and (15) a list of
persons and assets employed, retained, or utilized in the transaction. Id.
107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(4) (1989) (stating that rule 13e-3 only applies to holders of
equity securities).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d)(3)(e) (1989). Rule 13(e)-3(d)(3)(e) provides that:
The issuer ... engaging in the rule 13e-3 transaction . . . shall disclose to security
holders . . . of equity securities ... the information required by Item 8 (which
provides that the company must):
a) State whether the issuer ... reasonably believes that the rule 13e-3 transaction is
fair or unfair to ... security holders. If any director dissented to or abstained from
voting on the rule 13e-3 transaction, identify each such director and indicate, if
known, after making reasonable inquiry, the reason for each dissent or abstention
... [a blanket statement that a director has no reasonable belief as to the fairness
of the transaction will not satisfy the requirement].
b) Discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the belief stated in
[section a] is based and the weight assigned to each such factor.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100(13)(a) (1989). Rule 13(e)-100(13)(a) provides that:
[To] security holders who object to the transaction, [the company must] briefly outline
the rights which may be available to such security holders under [state] law.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (indicating that rule 13e-3 only applies to
holders of equity securities).
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the disclosure of information in third party transactions such as LBOs."'
Bondholders argue that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
should adopt a disclosure rule that would require management to state
whether management reasonably believes that an LBO is fair to all classes
of security holders, including bondholders."12 Such a rule would benefit
bondholders in two respects. First, bondholders would gain access to infor-
mation, including possible legal remedies, regarding the proposed transac-
tion." '3 Second, because the company would have to provide bondholders
with the company's predictions about the transaction, potential bondholder
losses would be a matter of public record." 4 A company, consequently,
might hesitate to proceed with an LBO that is unfair to the company's
bondholders." 5 A transaction that is unfair to bondholders may tarnish the
company's public image and may scare off potential investors in the
company's bonds."1
6
Even if the SEC did expand the fairness aspect of rule 13e-3 to cover
bondholders' interests in an. LBO, such an extension would not necessarily
protect bondholders."17 Management properly could claim that an LBO is
fair to bondholders as long as the surviving company satisfies the terms of
the indentures."' For instance, if RJR maintains its ability to repay interest
and principal to bondholders when due, then the LBO was fair to RJR
111. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that rule 13e-3 does not apply to
transactions such as LBOs).
112. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 312 (contending that, if SEC expanded coverage of
rule 13e-3 to bondholders, rule 13e-3 would protect bondholders from losses in extraordinary
transactions such as LBOs).
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing information that security holders
are entitled to receive under rule 13e-3).
114. 17 CF,R. § 240.13e-100(8)(b)(2) (1989). Section 240.13e-100(8)(b)(2) provides:
Conclusory statements such as "the rule 13e-3 transaction is fair to unaffiliated
security holders in relation to net book value, going concern value and future prospects
of the issuer" will not be considered sufficient disclosure ... [issuer must disclose
reasonably detailed analysis of proposed transaction].
If § 240.13e-100(8) applied to the investment grade bondholders in the RJR takeover, RJR
management would have had to assess publicly the effect on its pre-existing bonds of assuming
billions of dollars of debt.
115. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 312 (stating that company may hesitate before
proceeding with transaction that harms bondholders if company must disclose information
regarding harmful transaction).
116. See id. (describing undesirable future effects on surviving company if LBO harms
bondholders).
117. See Secretaries Group Urges SEC to Require Greater LBO Disclosure to Bondholders,
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 197 (Feb. 3, 1989) (noting SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest's
opinion that expanding disclosure rules to bondholders would fall to protect bondholders'
Interests). Commissioner Grtundfest maintains that a corporation could easily publish reports in
good faith which stated that an LBO was "fair" to bondholders. Id. Commissioner Grundfest
argued that bondholders still would suffer losses despite the disclosure of such fairness reports.
Id.
118. See Salwen, supra note 74, at C3, col. 3 (reporting that SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden asserted that corporations treat bondholders fairly as long as corporations meet
indenture's terms).
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bondholders." 9 Thus, despite the drastic drop in the value of the RJR bonds
because of the LBO, RJR management could claim that the LBO was fair
to bondholders.
2 0
Market realities further diminish any protection bondholders could
receive if the SEC expanded the scope of rule 13e-3 to include bondholders.
The extensive publicity of the RJR takeover established two new concepts. ' 2
First, the publicity revealed that almost any company is susceptible to an
LBO because of the widespread availability of debt financing. 22 Second,
the RJR takeover demonstrated that investment grade bondholders take a
substantial loss in highly leveraged transactions. 2 3 After the LBO of RJR,
investors buy investment grade bonds with the knowledge of the risks of
an LBO.1'4 Bondholders, thus, cannot claim perfunctorily that bondholders
are the victims of unforeseen LBOs which destroy the value of bonds.2'
Because current statutory and case law does not protect bondholders
sufficiently in the event of an LBO, 26 bondholders should use contractual
provisions to protect the value of their investments.' 27 Because of the
119. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (contending that if RJR repays principal
and interest to bondholder, LBO was fair). Because of the LBO, RJR's interest and debt
expenses rose from $549 million in 1988 to $3.38 billion in 1989. Baker, supra note 43 at DI0.
Despite losing $144 million in the fourth quarter of 1989, RJR has kept current on its debt
payments by selling off $5.5 billion in RJR assets. Id. Since the completion of the LBO, RJR
has sold off Del Monte Foods, some European food units, Chun King Oriental foods, and
Butter Finger and Baby Ruth candy bars. Id.
120. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (proposing that company can assert
fairness of LBO to bondholders if company meets terms of indenture after LBO).
121. See Wallace supra note 34, at CI, col. 2 (asserting that RJR takeover enlightened
bondholder of dangers of LBO and vulnerability of large companies to LBOs).
122. See, e.g., Farrell, Bondholders are Mad as Hell-And They're Not Going to Take It
Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 82 (contending that almost any industrial company is
vulnerable to takeover); Knight, supra note 20, at D9 (reporting that investors in corporate
bonds worry that RJR-type buyout may happen to any company); Wallace, supra note 31, at
D1, col. 3 (asserting that, revelation of RJR LBO drove down price of Sears, Roebuck &
Company's bonds for fear of similar takeover); Wallace, supra note 34, at Cl, col. 2 (contending
that, after RJR takeover, bond prices in consumer giants such as Ralston Purina, Proctor &
Gamble, and Sara Lee dropped as these companies worried about takeover similar to RJR
takeover). But see Bartlett, The New Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at DI, col. 3
(contending that debt financing is no longer popular corporate practice).
123. See Herzel & Shepro, supra note 68 (contending that bondholders are big losers in
highly leveraged deals); Hector, supra note 74, at 84 (stating that LBOs inherently hurt
bondholders).
124. See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 31, at 260 (asserting that rational bond-
holders recognize market risk); Sloan, The Rape of the Bondholder, FoRBEs, Jan. 23, 1989, at
68 (contending that present bond market is very much "buyer-beware" market).
125. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 153 (claiming that holders of new debt issues can
foresee and contractually control LBO-related injury and, thus, cannot easily claim to be victims
of LBO).
126. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 484 (contending that neither courts nor legislatures
has dealt with problem of bondholders' losses caused by leveraged transactions).
127. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing Metropolitan Life court's
repeated references to benefits to bondholders of contractual protection in indentures).
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heightened awareness of bondholder losses caused by LBOs, many prospec-
tive bondholders insist on the inclusion of highly elaborate protective
covenants in indentures.2'
One such protective covenant is the poison put.1 29 Poison puts allow
investors to cash in bonds before maturity if the company that issued the
128. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 155-57 (discussing bondholders who formed lobbying
groups to advocate for contractual protection). In late 1986 bondholder investment groups
lobbied the federal government to create laws that protected all investors in the event of an
LBO. Id. at 155. The lobbying efforts failed. Id. at 156. After the RJR buyout, however, new
lobbying groups emerged and urged issuers and underwriters to include protective covenants in
bond indentures. Id. at 157; see Grant, Bondholders Begin Struggle for Rights, CliN's N.Y.
Bus., July 4, 1988 (discussing lobbying efforts of Institutional Bondholders' Rights Association
that call for reemergence of protective covenants); Light, supra note 44 (reporting that bond-
holders request inclusion of protective covenants in indentures); Farrell, supra note 122, at 83
(reporting that bondholders are pushing companies to issue new bonds with protective covenants).
129. See Vlahakis & Nussbaum, supra note 37, at 66 n.15 (describing poison put provision
in indentures of Harris Corporation and Northwest Pipeline, Inc.). The poison put in Harris
Corporation's indenture provides:
4.01. In the event that (i) a Designated Event shall occur at any time on or prior
to the tenth anniversary of the date on which the Debentures are first issued under
this Indenture and (i) on any date within 90 days after a public filing has been made
with the Securities and Exchange Commission or other general public disclosure has
been made indicating the occurrence of such Designated Event, the then current rating
of the Debentures by Standard & Poor's Corporation or its successor ("S&P") or by
Moody's Investor's Service, Inc. or its successors ("Moody's") is downgraded to
lower than BBB, in the case of S&P, or lower than Baa3, in the case of Moody's
(or an equivalent successor rating) (the occurrence of the conditions specified in both
(i) and (ii) being a "Put Event"), then each registered holder of Debentures shall
have the right, at such holder's option, and subject to the conditions of this Article
Four, to put all or part of its Debentures to the Company for purchase by the
Company at a purchase price of 100% of the principal amount thereof, together with
interest accrued to the date fixed for such purchase (provided that if the date fixed
for such purchase is on or subsequent to the date on which interest is otherwise
payable to Debentureholders pursuant to Section 2.03 hereof, such interest shall be
payable to the registered holder of Debentures as of the applicable record date for
such interest payment). Any such put of Debentures for purchase by the Company
shall be irrevocable.
The term "Designated Event" means any one or more of the following events
which shall occur subsequent to the date of issuance of the Debentures:
(A)(1) the Company shall consolidate with or merge into any other corporation or
convey, transfer, or lease all or substantially all of its assets to any person (other
than a wholly owned subsidiary of the company) or (2) any corporation shall
consolidate with or merge into the Company, in either event pursuant to a transaction
in which any common stock of the Company outstanding immediately prior to the
effectiveness thereof is changed into or exchanged for cash, securities or other
property;
(B) any person (other than the Company or any Subsidiary) shall purchase 'or
otherwise acquire directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of securities of the
Company and, as a result of such purchase or acquisition, such person (together with
its associates and affiliates) shall directly or indirectly beneficially own in the aggregate
(1) twenty percent (20%) or more of the common stock of the Company, or (2)
securities representing twenty percent (20%) or more of the combined voting power
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:613
bonds is the subject of a successful takeover.'30 Poison puts increase the
cost to a bidder of buying the target company because the bidder must pay
off both the shareholders and the bondholders to consummate the takeo-
ver.13' Bondholders who cash in their bonds benefit from a poison put if a
takeover spawns a new, more leveraged, high risk company.
32
The basic provisions of a poison put give bondholders the right to
require the issuing company to repurchase the bonds within a specific, short
time period after the occurrence of a "designated event" and "qualifying
downgrade." A designated event may consist of: (1) a merger or transfer
of all or substantially all of the company's assets to another company; (2)
of the Company's voting securities, in each case under clause (I) or (2) outstanding
on the date immediately prior to the date of such purchase or acquisition (or, if there
be more than one, the last such purchase or acquisition);
(C) the Company or any Subsidiary shall purchase or otherwise acquire, directly
or indirectly, beneficial ownership of capital stock of the Company if, after giving
effect to such purchase or acquisition, the Company (together with all Subsidiaries)
shall have acquired, during any period of 12 consecutive months, beneficial ownership
of an aggregate of thirty percent (30%) or more of the capital stock of the company
outstanding on the date immediately prior to the first such purchase or acquisition
during such period; or
(D) on any date (a "Calculation Date") (1) the Company shall make any distribution
or distributions of cash, securities, or other properties (other than regular periodic
cash dividends at a rate which is substantially consistent with past practice, including
with respect to increases in dividends and other than common stock, or rights to
acquire common stock or preferred stock substantially equivalent to common stock)
to holders of capital stock, whether by means of dividend, reclassification, recapital-
ization or otherwise, or (2) the company or any Subsidiary shall purchase or otherwise
acquire, directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of capital stock, and the sum of
the Applicable Percentages of all such distributions, purchases and acquisitions which
have occurred on the Calculation Date and during the 365-day period immediately
preceding the Calculation Date shall exceed thirty percent (30%).
Id.
130. See Winkler, Wall Street Is Devising The Takeover Proof Bond, Wall St. J., Nov. 3,
1988, at C1, col. 3 (discussing history of poison puts). Winkler states that early poison puts,
drafted in the mid-1980s, were ineffective because the contractual provisions did not protect
bondholders from responses to "friendly" management buyouts. Id.; Light, supra note 44, at
-(explaining drawbacks of early poison puts). Another drawback of the early poison puts
was the provisions' inability to allow bondholders to sell bonds back to the company for profit
if the bonds were trading at a premium. Id. But see Vlahakis & Nussbaum, supra note 37, at
68 (describing modifications on poison puts that allow bondholders to sell bonds back to
company at premium). Vlahakis and Nussbaum assert that, if a bond was trading at a premium
over its market price when a designated event and qualifying downgrade occurred, the bondholder
would collect either a stated premium or an amount determined by comparing the bond to a
U.S. Treasury bond. Id. Corporate bonds are priced in relation to U.S. Treasury bonds of
comparable maturity. McDaniel, supra note 16, at 238. McDaniel states that, Treasury bonds
are risk-less and reflect the market rate of interest. Id. Because corporate bonds have a degree
of risk, the higher the degree of risk, (as compared to Treasury bonds), the higher the interest
rate (as compared to Treasury bonds). Id.
131. See Laderman, How Megadebt Shakes Up Banks and Bonds, Bus. Wic., Nov. 14,
1988 (contending that poison puts will increase cost of LBOs).
132. See id. (contending that bondholders can avert risk by selling bonds back to more
leveraged, surviving company).
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any change or exchange of a majority of the common stock of the company;
(3) any purchase or acquisition by any person of thirty percent (or some
other specified amount) or more of the company's common stock; (4) a
purchase by the company or one of its subsidiaries of thirty percent (or
some other specified amount) or more of its own common stock; or (5) a
change on the board of directors in which the continuing directors cease to
constitute at least a majority of the board. 3  A qualifying downgrade occurs
if the bond rating by Standard & Poor's is at least BBB (or Baa by Moody's)
twenty days prior to the occurrence of a designated event and subsequently
falls to a rating lower than BBB (or Baa).
34
In addition to poison puts, credit sensitive provisions may protect the
value of bonds from the consequences of an LBO. 3- Unlike poison puts,
credit sensitive provisions allow investors to retain their bonds after an
LBO.136 The credit sensitive provisions provide for an adjustable interest
rate that compensates bondholders for any increased risk which results when
a designated event, such as an LBO, and a qualifying downgrade occur. 37
Bondholders, therefore, will profit when interest rates on the bonds escalate
to reflect the increased risks to the bonds after an LBO. 38 By including
poison put and credit sensitive provisions in an indenture, bondholders faced
with a potential LBO will be able either to sell bonds back to the issuer at
face (or at a premium) value or retain the bonds and receive increased
interest payments. 39
Some investors contend that the effectiveness of any protective covenants
is dubious because bondholders will be unable to convince issuing companies
or underwriters' 40 to include such provisions in an indenture.14' Management
133. See Macey, supra note 31, at 188 (describing provisions of designated event).
134. See id. (discussing provisions of qualifying downgrade).
135. See Dazzo, Corporate and Mortgage Securities, THE BoND BUYER, June 2, 1989, at
2 (describing first fixed rate corporate bond issue that contained "credit sensitive" provisions
in indenture that protected bondholders from LBOs). Dazzo states that the interest rate in credit
sensitive bonds will adjust to changes in the bonds' investment grade rating. Id. For instance,
if Standard & Poor's and Moody's raise their ratings on a particular bond, the interest rate
payment on that bond will drop. Id. Conversely, if either Standard & Poor's or Moody's lowers
its rating on the bond, the interest rate payable on the bond will increase. Id.
136. See id. (asserting that bondholders may retain credit sensitive bonds after LBO and
receive compensation for additional risk caused by increased debt).
137. See Macey, supra note 31, at 188 (defining credit sensitive provisions that provide for
adjustable interest rates on bonds depending on bonds' credit rating); supra note 137 and
accompanying text (discussing how interest rate in credit sensitive bond adjusts when bond's
rating changes).
138. See Dazzo, supra note 135, at 2 (asserting that company will compensate holders of
credit sensitive bonds for any downgrading of bonds caused by increased risk to company).
139. See Macey, supra note 31, at 188 (illustrating effect of using dual protective clauses
of poison put and credit sensitive provisions).
140. See BARRoN's DICTIONARY OF FINANCE Ai4D INvEsrmENT TERMs 452 (2d ed. 1987)
(defining underwriter as investment banker who, singly or as member of underwriting group,
agrees to purchase new issue of securities from issuer and distribute securities to investors).
141. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 464 (contending that underwriters and issuers preclude
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of the issuing company usually negotiates the terms of the indenture with
the underwriters, who then purchase the securities for immediate resale to
the public. 142 The issuing company seeks to draft an indenture that provides
for a low interest rate and contains few restrictive covenants. 43 The under-
writers, in contrast, argue for an indenture with sufficient protection so
that the issue is marketable.' 44 Individual bondholders typically do not
participate in the negotiation of the indenture. 1
45
Although individual bondholders usually do not participate in the in-
denture negotiations, individual bondholders indirectly may influence the
drafting of the indenture. Since the RJR takeover, bondholder lobbying
groups and an increasing number of bond investors now request that issuers
and underwriters include protective covenants in indentures. '4 Issuing com-
panies have been receptive to the input of bondholders because of the tax
advantages of debt to the issuers. 47 Underwriters also have become more
sensitive to bondholders' concerns after underwriters have had increased
difficulty selling covenant-free bonds since the buyout of RJR.148 Thus,
individual bondholders from participating in indenture negotiations and, thus, individual bond-
holders cannot demand inclusion of terms in indenture). But see infra note 153 and accompanying
text (asserting that institutional bondholders have direct influence in indenture negotiations).
142. See Robertson, supra note 2, at 464 (asserting that issuing company typically negotiates
indenture's terms with underwriters).
143. See id. (stating terms that issuers want in indentures).
144. See id. (declaring what underwriters want in indentures).
145. See id. (asserting that individual bondholders usually do not negotiate indenture
terms). Robertson states that institutional investors like MetLife play a significant role in the
bond market and frequently purchase whole issues of publicly issued bonds. Id. Because of the
financial importance of the institutional investor to the bond market, issuing companies make
certain that publicly issued bonds have the minimal protection necessary to ensure institutional
sales. Id. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. signaled to issuing companies that
institutional investors now demand that indentures contain more protective covenants. Wallace,
supra note 34, at Cl, col. 2.
146. See Grant, supra note 128 (discussing plan of Institutional Bondholders Rights
Association to protect bondholders by developing and advocating for inclusion of protective
covenants in indentures); Farrell, supra note 122, at 82 (reporting that bondholders push
companies to issue new bonds with covenants that limit losses in future restructuring of
company); Light, supra note 44 (contending that, since RJR takeover, more bond buyers have
issuers include protective covenants in indentures).
147. See Farrell, supra note 122, at 82 (reporting that influence of bondholders on United
States companies is growing because, increasingly, debt is replacing equity as America's risk
capital). Corporations favor debt because a company can deduct from its taxes the interest that
a company pays on its debt. Brady Urges Curbs on LBO Tax Deductions Be Linked to Double
Dividend Tax Relief, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 152 (Jan. 27, 1989). Conversely, companies
must pay taxes on their earnings, including the portion distributed as dividends to holders of
equity in the company. Id. Because companies prefer debt to equity, bondholders may convince
issuers to include protective covenants in indentures by refusing to buy issues that lack adequate
protections. See Grant, supra note 128 (citing examples of bond issues that did not sell because
of lack of protective covenants).
148. See Laderman, supra note 131 (discussing underwriters' difficulties in selling bonds
after buyout of RJR). Laderman explains that, after RJR management announced the proposed
takeover of RJR, underwriters could sell only about one-third of a $300 million offering of
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despite the absence of individual bondholders at indenture negotiations,
several issuers and underwriters have complied with bondholder wishes and
issued bonds that contain protective covenants such as poison puts and
credit sensitive provisions.
49
While effectively protecting bondholder interests, poison puts and credit
sensitive provisions greatly restrict the flexibility of management to run a
company by constraining management's ability to take risks. 50 These pro-
visions impede management's ability to finance, invest, and distribute as-
sets.' Management, however, may derive some benefits from including
protective covenants in an indenture. 5 2 For instance, management can
demand that bondholders who want protective covenants pay a higher price
for the bonds. 53 Alternatively, a company may pay bondholders a lower
yield on bonds that contain protective covenants.
15 4
Critics of contractual remedies assert that protective covenants do not
address adequately the inequities that an LBO inflicts on bondholders. 55 In
light of an LBO's devastating effect on bondholders and conversely bene-
ficial effect to management and stockholders, some commentators demand
Eastman-Kodak Co. bonds before the underwriters had to cut prices and raise interest rates on
the bond issue. Id. The trading of many companies' bond issues simply dried up when investors
saw the companies as vulnerable to swift changes in credit quality. Id. Bond issues of corporate
giants, such as Sara Lee, Ralston Purina, and Sears Roebuck & Co., practically stopped trading
after the RJR takeover. Id.
149. See Farrell, supra note 122, at 83 (listing Harris Corporation, Northwest Pipeline,
and Grumman Corporation as companies that issued bonds with poison puts after RJR). Farrell
believes that Grumman Corporation is an example of a company that needed working capital
immediately and, therefore, included a poison put in its bonds to ensure that underwriters could
sell the bonds quickly and smoothly. Id. The Grumman bonds, in fact, did sell quickly. Id.
Northwest Pipeline bonds with poison puts also sold well. See Kelly, Northwest Pipeline Deal
Well Received, TEE BoND BUYER, Nov. 23, 1988, at 78 (noting that Northwest Pipeline's poison
put bonds received warm welcome from market). Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, Mellon
Bank Corporation, Ford Motor Credit Corporation, and General Electric Capital Corporation
all have issued bonds with credit sensitive provisions in their respective indentures. Id. See supra
note 136-39 and accompanying text (explaining credit sensitive provisions).
150. See Light, supra note 44, at 79 (contending that covenants that protect bondholders
severely limit management's flexibility to restructure company).
151. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 162 (discussing debtor corporation's need to manage
assets without creditor interference); Vlahakis and Nussbaum, supra note 37, at 63 (noting that
tension between restrictive financial covenants and business flexibility has made some issuers
shy away from contractual provisions).
152. See Herzel & Shepro, supra note 68 (concluding that management can obtain alternative
benefits by placing protective covenants in indentures).
153. See id. (concluding that bondholders have to pay price for protection in bonds). Safer
bonds pay lower interest rates. Id. The increased price for bonds containing protective covenants
has not reduced the demand for protective covenants. Id. From January 1989 to June 1989,
bond investors purchased $14 billion worth of bonds containing protective covenants, almost
as much as bond investors purchased in all of 1988. Light, supra note 44, at 78.
154. See Lehn, Blackwell, supra note 17, at 185 (asserting that bondholders pay price for
protective covenants by receiving lower interest rates on bonds).
155. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 209 (contending that many investors accept bondholder
losses caused by LBOs as inherent investment risk).
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action, albeit judicial, legislative or regulatory, to alleviate bondholder
losses.1 56 Bondholders, however, should not receive protection for which
they did not bargain simply because LBOs cause bond values to drop.
5 7
Bondholders who deal with corporations should be able to protect bond-
holders' interests. 58 Neither a governmental agency nor a court should alter
an indenture that bondholders accepted by providing added protection to
the bondholders. 159
One commentator also criticizes the effectiveness of explicit protective
covenants because such provisions do not cover every conceivable contin-
gency. 60 Many investors believe that management hires skilled counsel to
obfuscate the intended effects of any protective language in an indenture.'
6'
While creating the perfect contract is impossible, protective covenants can
protect bondholders from LBOs.162 Judge Walker in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. repeatedly referred to the original
MetLife-RJR indentures that contained restrictive covenants which would
have protected MetLife had the covenants been in effect at the time of the
RJR takeover. 63 In fact, after RJR accepted KKR's buyout offer, holders
of some RJR bonds demanded that RJR buy back almost $500 million of
the bondholders' bonds because RJR had incurred such a large amount of
LBO-generated debt.' 64 The indentures governing these bonds contained
156. See id. at 237 (contending that contractual remedy does not effectively protect
bondholders in event of LBO); H. Kamen, Remarks at Meeting of American Bar Association
on the Impact of LBOs on Debtholders and Other Corporate Constituencies (1989 Honolulu)
(same); supra notes 70-132 and accompanying text (describing possible governmental solutions
to bondholder losses caused by LBO).
157. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 145 (asserting that law should not compensate "irra-
tional" bondholders who fail to protect themselves by buying bonds with protective covenants);
Robertson, supra note 2, at 466-67 (stating that rational bondholders are aware of dangers of
company issuing more debt and can obtain contractual protection against this type of manage-
ment activity).
158. See Bratton, supra note 39, at 101 (contending that idea of bondholder self-protection
dominates real world corporate debtor-creditor relationships).
159. See id. at 110 (asserting that legal intervention to protect creditor rarely is justified).
Bratton contends that, prior to insolvency, the law holds to a policy of non-intervention in the
debtor-creditor relationship. Id. at 102.
160. See McDaniel, supra note 16, at 235 (contending that indenture never can be complete
because indenture cannot contain covenants that cover every contingency).
161. See Longa, UAL Shares Soar But Bonds Sink on Possible Takeovers, REtrrEms, Aug.
11, 1989 (describing many investors' belief that highly paid lawyers can interpret special legal
covenants to benefit of corporation and to detriment of investors); Farrell, Takeovers and
Buyouts Clobber Blue Chip Bondholders, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 114 (quoting statement
of Drexel Burnham, Lambert, Inc.'s CEO Fred Joseph that, "There's no protective covenant
that a good lawyer can't get around.").
162. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (noting that holders of RJR Swiss
bonds had effective protective covenants that shielded holders from risks of RJR takeover).
163. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (describing RJR-MetLife indentures that
would have protected bondholders from LBO).
164. See Dazzo, Court Order Blocks RJR Nabisco Buyout In Responses to Lawsuit by
Swiss Investors, THE BoND BUYER, May 20, 1989, at 3 (describing efforts by holders of RJR
Swiss-Franc bonds to sell bonds back to RJR because RJR incurred LBO-related debt).
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provisions allowing the bondholders to put the bonds back to RJR if RJR
reorganized. 165 Instead of exercising the put option, the bondholders and
RJR, as a result of negotiations, took out letters of credit to assure the
bondholders that RJR had sufficient equity to maintain RJR's payments
on the bonds.'6 Despite the bondholders' decisibn to refrain from exercising
the put option in the indenture, the RJR bondholders effectively protected
their interests against the consequences of the LBO of RJR. 167
Investment grade bondholders can protect their bonds from the adverse
ramifications of an LBO through contractual provisions.'6 These bond-
holders do not need, nor do they deserve, legislative or regulatory protec-
tion.'69 Protective covenants, such as poison puts and credit sensitive
provisions, allow bondholders to avoid the consequence of an LBO decreas-
ing the value of bonds.17 0 Poison puts negate the debilitating effects of an
LBO by allowing bondholders to sell bonds back to the issuer at a pre-
LBO price if the LBO decreases the value of the bonds.' 7 1 Credit sensitive
provisions enable bondholders to retain bonds and possibly profit from an
LBO by requiring the issuer to raise the interest rate on the bonds to reflect
the increased risk of the newly leveraged surviving company. 72 As a cost
of obtaining a more protective indenture, bondholders undoubtedly will
have to accept lower yields from the bonds and pay a higher price for the
bonds.17 1 Individual bond investors will bear an additional burden because,
as outsiders to the negotiations of the indenture, individual bondholders
cannot demand that the indenture contain protective covenants. 7 4 Individual
bond investors thus should purchase solely from issuing companies that
already provide contractual protection in the indenture. 7 Protective cove-
165. See, e.g., Winkler, Two Underwriters Demand RJR Call Swiss Franc Bonds, Wall St.
J., Feb. 7, 1989, at Cl, col. 3 (describing protective covenants in indenture that allowed
bondholders to put bonds back to RJR); Swiss Investors Create Hurdles for RJR, BoNDwwEK,
March 27, 1989 (same); Fanning, Bonds that Bind, FoRBs, May 1, 1989, at 48 (same).
166. See J. Grundfest, Remarks at Meeting of American Bar Association on the Impact
of LBO's on Debtholders and Other Corporate Constituencies (1989 Honolulu) (describing
RJR's actions to appease RJR bondholders who were irate over LBO of RJR).
167. See id. (asserting that RJR's obtaining letters of credit to ensure security of Swiss-
Franc bonds proves that contractual provisions can protect bondholders).
168. See supra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (describing effective contractual meas-
ures by which investors may protect bonds in event of LBOs).
169. See supra notes 69-125 and accompanying text (contending that bondholders should
not receive governmental protection from LBOs).
170. See supra notes 127-67 and accompanying text (contending that protective covenants
in indenture can protect bondholders from losses due to LBO).
171. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text (discussing beneficial aspects of poison
puts).
172. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (explaining beneficial aspects of credit
sensitive provisions).
173. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (asserting that bondholders will receive
less profit from bonds as compensation for added security of protective covenants).
174. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (noting that individual bondholders
typically cannot demand that indenture contain protective covenants).
175. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (asserting that individual bondholders
must buy bonds from companies that include protective covenants in indenture).
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nants will prevent both individual bondholders and institutional bondholders
from suffering the horrendous losses that may result from an LBO.
76
PETER KELLY O'BRiN
176. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (illustrating that protective covenants
in indenture can prevent bondholder losses caused by LBO).
